OBSERVING AL QAEDA THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPLEXITY THEORY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO DEFEAT TERRORISM
The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish by test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.
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−Carl Von Clausewitz On War
The defeat of al Qaeda and the global network of Islamic terrorist organizations often appear no more certain today than it did two years ago. Since 9/11 the world has witnessed terrorist attacks against US interests and its allies in seven different countries. Al Qaeda may have lost Afghanistan as a safe haven, but it has gained a new front by conducting operations against US and coalition forces in Iraq. Despite US military successes, al Qaeda retains a demonstrated ability to recruit and conduct operations globally as Osama bin Laden and many of his most experienced inner circle and associates are still at large. 2 Although there has yet to be another devastating attack on the US homeland, it is important to remember that the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon took over three years of planning and preparation. 3 The lack of a subsequent catastrophic attack in the US since 9/11 is not in itself proof of a successful strategy against terrorism. Despite the efforts of two years of military operations against al Qaeda, the CIA pronounced that al Qaeda still represents the single greatest risk to US national security. 4 This paradox calls into question the very frameworks, models and tools that US strategic leaders use to develop counter terrorism policy and strategy.
The scientific method, Newtonian physics, modern and Industrial age organizational theory, all reflect reductionist assumptions and paradigms embedded within US strategic concepts and military doctrines that are used to develop responses to terrorism. 5 Our military doctrine prescribes that strategic planning must first determine our adversary's essential capabilities and characteristics from which it derives its power or freedom of action and then by destroying that "center of gravity", strategic victory is achieved. 6 Many of the US strategic processes, models and doctrine employ a reductionist and linear analytical methodology, which attempts to reduce an adversary's capabilities and strengths into component parts. 7 The global terrorist structures of today are not machines or nation states whose component parts are constrained by organizational structures and processes, which can be analyzed with linear reductionist methodologies. Indeed, networks appear to be highly resilient and evolve specifically to survive destruction of its seemingly most vital component parts. Reductionist models and tools used by today's senior leaders may not by themselves sufficiently clarify the pervasive ambiguity and complexities presented by the threat of anti-American global terrorism. 8 Conversely, alternative theories that bring into focus networks and dynamic systems may help inform a US strategy to defeat global terrorism.
The alternative theory this paper examines is Complexity Theory, which as any theory, seeks to explain or gain understanding and comprehension of the environment, behaviors and events around us. Theory provides a lens through which to clarify events and behaviors that might otherwise seem clouded and informs our decisions and actions relative to a set of phenomenon. 9 Complexity Theory views behaviors and actions as the interrelationship between a great many components parts. 10 It refers to these interrelationships or systems as complex, because it is impossible to fully understand these systems by reducing them to an examination of their constituent parts. 11 Instead, Complexity Theory holds that interactions produce collective behaviors and characteristics that are not exhibited when the components parts are examined individually. 12 This is in contrast with reductionist theories, which seek to comprehend a phenomenon by examining its individual attributes and are insufficient to understand complex networks.
Using Complexity Theory as a guide, this paper analyses al Qaeda as part of a global anti-American Islamic terrorist network and develops recommendations to improve the US strategy aimed at defeating terrorists from perpetrating further catastrophic acts against the United States homeland. This paper first describes the fundamental characteristics of Complexity Theory. Using these fundamental characteristics as criteria, this paper analyzes al Qaeda's behaviors to support the proposition that al Qaeda is a highly complex and adaptive network and identifies the elements of Al Qaeda's resilience to the current US counter terrorism strategy. Finally, to best inform a strategy against the terrorist network, this paper examines the underlying origins, conditions and sources upon which the network interdependencies emerge.
Understanding the sources of these interdependencies provides evidence regarding al Qaeda's fitness and identifies elements to develop a more comprehensive strategy to defeat it.
WHAT IS COMPLEXITY THEORY
Complexity Theory is primarily about the dynamics of networks: it is the study of self-reinforcing interdependent interactions and how much such interactions create evolution, fitness and surprise.
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−Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien
Complexity Theory is a relatively new multidiscipline field of study often referred to as the Marion and Uhl-Bien, experts in the field of complexity and organizational theories, described emergence as a phenomenon by which networks are generated from need seeking entities --called agents. 18 These agents are driven by local assessments and motivated by necessity to couple with other agents forming interdependent relationships to the mutual fulfillment of their individual requirements. Therefore, complex dynamic networks spontaneously propagate and are not created by central deterministic intelligence. Emergence also consists of the phenomenon in which interrelationships between large numbers of disparate agents create collective novel behavior and act as a single purposeful entity. The network exhibits behavior that the constituents could not attain individually. Simply described, a complex dynamic system is always greater than sum of its parts.
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Stuart Kauffman, a biologist and complexity theorist, determined that self-organization is the fundamental characteristic of complex dynamic networks. 20 Five fundamental elements of self-organizing networks are adaptation, correlation, coupling, aggregation and recursion.
Complex networks are referred to as "adaptive" or "dynamic", because they are constantly changing their interrelationships based upon the needs of individual agents and environmental impacts. John Holland, a pioneer in the field of complexity, coined the term "complex adaptive agents" to describe the constantly evolving nature of complex systems. 21 Individual agents within the network are constantly reassessing their need preferences and the degree to which they will compromise to bond with other agents. 22 Consequently, the network adapts through the process of compromise and competition, called correlation, in which each entity accepts, rejects or changes its relationship with other agents based upon its needs and the changing environment. Kauffman referred to the interdependent bonding of agents as "coupling," and Marion categorized these relationships as loose, moderate or tight. 23 Tightly coupled agents display high degrees of interdependence, while other sets of agents are described as moderately or only loosely coupled due to low degrees of interdependence. Holland referred that these sets of agents bond through the process of correlation and are united by shared purpose or interest as "aggregates". 24 Aggregates may accumulate with many other sets of agents or structures to form meta-aggregates and further connect with yet other structures that accomplish diverse functions or roles to then form meta-meta-aggregates. This accumulation of aggregates does not imply hierarchy or fixed structures. Instead complex networks are said to be recursive, meaning that through the process of aggregation and correlation the network develops redundant multi-way chains of causality to accomplish its collective interests and contribute to the network's resilience. 25 Resilience is the capability of complex networks to absorb or recuperate from assaults on its constituent parts. The resilience of complex systems can be attributed primarily to its selforganizing characteristic. The elements of self-organization enable a complex network to behave like viruses that spontaneously seek opportunities to spread and adapt in the face of adversity to form more virulent strains. 26 In complex networks adaptation is spontaneous, because innovation emerges from the constituent parts rather than a single directing intelligence. 27 Complexity Theory implies that hierarchical organizations can never be as resilient as complex networks, because the power of complex networks resides not within its leadership or a few capabilities, but within its ability to spontaneously adapt to changes in the surrounding environment. 28 Consequently, multidirectional and redundant pathways of interdependent relationships allow networks to survive assaults on its constituent parts.
Furthermore, agents change their levels of dependencies (tight, moderate, or loose coupling) with other agents and aggregates to further enhance their resilience. 29 Loosely coupled networks can absorb changes in the environment and assaults on the network due to the low interdependence levels. 30 Conversely, tight couplings enhance close coordination and cooperation, but are highly interdependent and as a result they are more vulnerable to disruption. 31 In summary, complex networks adapt and self-organize to seek the optimal balance of all three types of coupling to enhance their individual and collective performance and resilience.
NETWORK FITNESS DEFINED
The fitness of a network is proportional to its degree of emergence and resilience, or said another way, its ability to self-propagate and recuperate. A fit network has to have three main elements: first it must have a multitude of individual entities; second those entities must be compelled by a need to interact; and third the network must possess a balance of loose, moderate and tight coupling appropriate to its needs. 32 The more broad, urgent and widely accepted the need or interest, the larger and more fit the network. Therefore, fit networks can emerge from common need preferences that are neither attainable individually nor provided through other alternatives. 33 A multitude of loose and moderately coupled interrelationships allows network to dissipate the impact of assaults or environmental changes. 34 Conversely, tightly coupled networks are vulnerable for disruption, because damage to one part of the network can easily surge across numerous linkages causing network wide damage. 35 Likewise, network fitness is vulnerable to alternative structures or other networks that more efficiently or effectively compete for the need preferences of its agents. Faced with other alternatives, some loose and some lesser number of moderately coupled agents will choose to bond with structures that require fewer sacrifices or compromise of their individual need preferences.
AL QAEDA: A COMPLEX DYNAMIC NETWORK
This paper will now examine al Qaeda's behavior using the three characteristics of
Complexity Theory described in the previous section to demonstrate that al Qaeda is a complex dynamic network. Analyzing the 9/11 terrorist plot, terrorist financing and al Qaeda's broader organizational behaviors will show that al Qaeda exhibits the characteristics of emergence, selforganization and resilience.
The formation of 9/11 terrorist cells as described by the CIA Director, George Tenant, in
Congressional testimony provides a clear example of the emergent nature of the al Qaeda network. 36 The 9/11 terrorist cells originated from the ordinary friendship between Muhammad Atta and two other foreign students in Hamburg, Germany in the 1990s. The three were university students from different Middle East countries, and one had been studying aircraft design at the Hamburg School of Applied Science. They met at mosques, coffee houses and local gathering places. Although neither they nor the mosque they attended were known for extremist views, these students were nonetheless drawn together by their increasingly disenchantment with the West in general and the US in particular. They met with other like-minded Muslim men in an ever widening circle of acquaintances, which eventually led them to a German-Syrian named Muhammad Heydar Zammer who was active in Islamic extremist groups since 1980. About this same time, the terrorists Ramzi Yousef and the Abu Saif group were planning to place timed explosives on passenger airliners bound for the US and use airliners as weapons to fly into the World Trade Center and the CIA headquarters. Yousef discussed his ideas with his uncle Khalid Shaihk Muhammad who was associated with al Qaeda. 37 The ideas and concepts for a massive attack on the US using airliners were now emerging among various terrorist groups, and Muhammad Atif, a key associate of Osama bin Laden, studied the idea and discussed it with bin Laden. Thinking the concept had merit, they communicated the idea and provided various resource contacts to several other associates around the globe including Khalid Shaihk Mohammad. About the same time in 1997, through a wide web of acquaintances Mohammed met with Atta and Zacarias Moussaoui, the so called 20 th hijacker. 38 Coupled with Muhammad and armed with this new idea and some financial and technical contacts, Atta and his associates emerged from a small group of disenchanted university students into a terrorist cell. In total, the plot expanded to include three cells of 19 hijackers with members originating from seven different countries. All but two of the hijackers had no previous associations to religious extremism or terrorist organizations as Tenet lamented that 17 of the 19 plotters were "absolutely clean." 39 The 9/11 terrorist cell was not created or directed by a central node or hierarchical apparatus. Instead, the entities within the network were coupled together by loose informal associations forming mutually dependant interrelationships with an ever widening group of like-minded Muslims. Simply stated, the 9/11 cells emerged from the bottom-up.
Organizationally, al Qaeda is intentionally decentralized with recursive operational and financial interrelationships dispersed geographically across numerous associated terrorist organizations that adapt, couple and aggregate in pursuit of common interests. 40 Operationally, al Qaeda is more accurately a loosely coupled meta-meta-aggregation of like-minded men and organizations united by a common purpose and constantly adapt their interrelationships. 41 The
State Department reported that al Qaeda has coupled with at least twenty-eight other Islamic terrorist organizations centered in more than a dozen different countries forming a global aggregation of Islamic anti-American terrorism. 42 Al Qaeda has long been established with terrorist groups worldwide including the Philippine based Abu Sayyaf, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Indonesian Laskar Jihad. 43 The interrelationships between these groups constantly change. As one French intelligence analyst lamented, "if you have a good knowledge of the network today, it is not operational tomorrow." 44 Another terrorist expert described the network as "a constantly changing virus that is impossible to totally grasp or destroy." 45 A previous associate of bin Laden observed that al Qaeda was not as well organized or orchestrated as some would believe, but rather bin Laden directly controlled only a very small group around him and outside of that were "tens of thousands who are sympathetic and arranged themselves in small groups in a very loose network." 46 58 The global terrorist network appears decidedly resilient to attacks against its component parts, and it is not simply "on the run".
SOURCES OF AL QAEDA'S FITNESS
There is a new phenomenon of increased hostility of Muslims against America. Not only Arab Muslims, but non-Arab Muslims who believe America is the reason for many problems in the Muslim world . . .
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−al Fagih, PBS Frontline
The popularity of al Qaeda's goals combined with the lack of alternatives provides for its continued emergence, while its diverse levels of interdependencies provide for its resilience. respondents sited that the fall of Saddam's regime was the best thing that ever happened in their lives, but paradoxically, they also responded that the US invasion of their country was the worst thing that had happened to them. 70 The same poll showed that more than four out of five Iraqi's have no trust or confidence in the US led coalition.
The US has provided military, economic and political support to Israel for decades. The third element of fitness is the absence of alternatives, as national governments in the region are either unwilling or unable to employ their political, economic or military power to assuage these pan-Islamic interests and thereby reduce al Qaeda's emergence. 80 Many of these regimes lack the willing support of their own populations, and Islamic extremist groups offer the only sources for organized opposition to regimes many view as illegitimate. 81 Other than the terrorist and political Islamic extremist organizations there are no alternative venues for effective opposition to US policies.
FIGURE 1 REALATIVE SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES TO COUPLING AND CORRELATION
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
There are legions of young men who seethe with resentment at America and its power . . . long after Mr. bin Laden has faded into history, they seem likely to form a ready pool of recruits for messianic leaders. 83 
−John Burns New York Times
The goals and objectives articulated in the current US strategy are all necessary elements to disrupt future acts of catastrophic terror against the US homeland. 84 testified that the training and planning that occurred in the US and Europe in preparation for the 9/11 attacks were far more devastating than the activities that took place in the Afghanistan camps. 85 Other than recognizing the importance of the Israeli -Palestinian conflict in "winning the war of ideas," the US strategy does not address the other three sources of emergence, nor does the strategy recognize the criticality of the loosely coupled aspects of the network to al Qaeda's overall fitness. Although the current strategy proposes strengthening the ability of weak states to battle terrorism and coercing the cooperation of states unwilling to support the war on terrorism, the strategy has no provisions for strengthening legitimate alternatives to terrorism in achieving popular pan-Islamic interests. The current US strategy must expand its goals and objectives to directly address the elements of al Qaeda's fitness.
A primary goal in the US strategy to defeat terrorism, based upon al Qaeda's fitness, must include diminishing the loosely coupled segments of the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda's fitness emanates from bin Laden's tightly coupled inner circle to the loosely coupled cells that proliferate his ideology in the Mosques and coffee houses. Sympathy for bin Laden's goals provides massive support for terrorism and creates an atmosphere of anonymity by which the network flourishes. As with most terrorist organizations, al Qaeda emerged from the politically weak and disenfranchised to provide a means for these people to achieve their political objectives. 86 A strategy that diminishes the multitude of loosely coupled agents and aggregates that support the al Qaeda network will make it less fit. The loosely coupled portion of the network provides the pool of agents that migrate through the process of correlation to increasing levels of terrorist support. Therefore, diminishing the pool of agents, which fuels the emergence will cause corresponding (albeit non-linear) constriction in some lesser number of moderately coupled elements of the network. The resultant decrease in the loosely coupled portions of the network will reduce the recursive element of al Qaeda's self-organizing dynamic. Lower levels of loose and moderately coupled aggregates will make the network more vulnerable to attacks on its constituents. As stated previously, the tighter the network dependencies, the more vulnerable it is for disruption. Lesser proportions of loosely and moderately coupled agents will make the entire network more vulnerable and less resilient to attacks on any of its entities.
Constriction of the al Qaeda network will facilitate the other elements of the US strategy, particularly the military and economic. Although diminishing the population of loosely coupled agents is unlikely to create a significant reduction in violent perpetrators (due to the extremely small population required relative to the overall sympathetic population), military operations to locate and destroy terrorists and their safe havens and mechanisms to find and disrupt terrorist finance will benefit from a terrorist network that is constricted to increasingly dependant interrelationships. Likewise, military and economic successes will further deter and constrict the emergence of new entities. Unfortunately, constricting the terrorist network will not be easy or quick.
A strategy to diminish the loosely coupled segment of the terrorist network will have to accomplish two objectives: first, the strategy must identify, foster and enable alternative structures or networks that compete against terrorism and second, the strategy needs to redress the four sources of anti-American sentiment. A graphic representation of the desired effect of this two-fold strategy on the terrorist network appears in Figure 2 (Desired Effect of Strategic Enhancements) and is now described more fully.
The US must identify, foster and enable any structures that provide non-violent alternatives to terrorism. Proliferating and strengthening non-violent alternatives to terrorism will constrict the al Qaeda network. Alternative non-violent networks capable of effectively satisfying common need preferences of Muslims will attract more constituents than a terrorist organization for the simple reason that interrelationships with the terrorist network poses greater individual risk and requires higher levels of correlation. Alternative structures could include a variety of different organizations such as multilateral and international organizations, moderate
Islamic religious groups, non-governmental agencies and national governments. The essential quality of these organizations is their individual or combined ability to employ political, economic or informational powers to redress the sources of al Qaeda's emergence. The US should quietly support and connect these structures as a network to compete against al Qaeda.
Although it is unlikely that such structures would dissuade the relatively few "true believes" who are committed to violence against the US, it would make them more vulnerable to attack.
Military and economic aspects of the current deterrence strategy in turn would increase the risks of supporting terrorist organizations and contribute to the attractiveness of alternative nonviolent structures.
To accomplish the second strategic objective of reducing the four sources of antiAmerican sentiment, the US must focus all its elements of power together with the international community to establish policies that diminish the sources of al Qaeda's emergence.
Specifically, the US and its allies must work to find a solution to the Israeli -Palestinian conflict.
The current US strategy to combat terrorism recognizes, "that no other issue has so colored the perception of the United States." 87 The US can not afford unconditional support for repressive regimes in return for cooperation in fighting terrorism. Unconditional support for repressive regimes increases emergence of new terrorist entities and is counterproductive to the goal of defeating the network. The US should continue to support the counter terrorism efforts of its Middle East allies, while simultaneously strengthening political reform, economic assistance and educational programs. These policies will increase the legitimacy of the governments in the region, serve to further isolate the terrorist network, and establish these governments as alternatives to terrorism. Finally, the establishment of a stable Iraqi government, which has the willing support of its population and a subsequent withdrawal of US forces from both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, will help ameliorate anti-American ideology. Combined with the current aspects of US strategy, these four strategic objectives will form a more holistic strategy to defeat the anti-American global network of Islamic terrorism.
FIGURE 2 DESIRED EFFECT OF STRATEGIC ENHANCEMENTS
CONCLUSION
The evidence provided by this examination of al Qaeda's behaviors clearly supports the proposition that global terrorism is a complex dynamic network. Al Qaeda is more accurately and Arabs who are sympatric to its goals and arrayed in a variety of tight, moderate, but primarily loosely coupled entities. The lack of effective alternatives to terrorism contributes to this network's fitness. The current elements of the US strategy to directly defeat the efforts of terrorists are necessary components in limiting or disrupting the terrorist network. However, no US counter terrorism strategy will long succeed without reducing the sources from which the terrorist network emerged and without diminishing the loosely coupled aggregates that support it. To defeat al Qaeda the US must diminish the loosely coupled segments of the network to attack the network's emergent, self-organizing and resilient characteristics. To accomplish this goal the US must strengthening alternative structures that effectively compete against al Qaeda in meeting the need preferences of Arab Muslims. This strategy combined with policies aimed at diminishing the four sources of ant-Americanism, will increase the networks isolation and make it more vulnerable to the elements of the current strategy. frameworks to what they described as the dynamic nonlinear systems. The collection of Nobel laureates, physicists, economists, biologists and others came together to understand the spontaneous self-organizing dynamics they observed in world around them. The founder George Cowan and first president of the institute described its purpose: "We believed that they were forging the first rigorous alternative to the kind of linear reductionist [emphasis added] thinking that has dominated science since the time of Newton."
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